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Introduction
Increasing demand for critical care has made capacity 
limitations commonplace in the ICU [1]. Th ese limita-
tions occur when there are no available ICU beds for 
patients with critical illness, leading to delays in ICU 
admission that have important clinical and economic 
consequences. Admission delays can result in the board-
ing of critically ill patients in the emergency department 
or in other hospital units, which is associated with 
increased morbidity and mortality [2,3]. Admission 
delays can also result in decreased revenue for hospitals, 
as they may force hospitals to cancel elective surgeries or 
transfers from outside hospitals.
Th ese problems have forced the critical care com mu-
nity to develop innovative ways to address capacity 
constraints and improve throughput. Yet these problems 
are not unique to the ICU, or even unique to healthcare 
in general. Limited capacity and the resulting problems 
of waiting times and throughput losses exist in many 
processes, ranging from ﬁ nancial services to automotive 
production. Th e academic ﬁ eld of operations manage-
ment is speciﬁ cally designed to address these issues. Th e 
purpose of the present review is to provide a brief 
overview of operations management and to present a set 
of case studies from work environments other than hos-
pi tals, thereby exposing readers to operations manage-
ment and its potential application to critical care.
What is operations management?
Working with capacity limitations
Many operations – in particular, service processes such 
as restaurants and airlines – have high ﬁ xed costs. Th ese 
ﬁ xed costs typically reﬂ ect the cost of maintaining a 
certain capacity availability, where capacity is deﬁ ned as 
the maximum number of customers that can be served 
per unit of time. Examples of ﬁ xed costs include the 
wages required to pay labor or the cost of machinery for 
production. Yet while costs in services tend to be ﬁ xed, 
revenue increases proportionally to the number of 
customers served per unit time – also referred to as 
throughput. Th is scenario creates an economic incentive 
to operate the process at a high level of utilization, where 
utilization is deﬁ ned as the ratio of the number of 
customers served (the throughput) to the maximum 
number of customers that we could serve (the capacity).
Consider the following simpliﬁ ed example. A service 
has a ﬁ xed cost of $1,000 per day and obtains $20 per 
customer served. Th e operation thus breaks even at 50 
customers served per day. At 60 customers per day, the 
service obtains $200 in proﬁ ts per day. At 70 customers, 
the process obtains $400 in proﬁ ts. In other words, 
increasing the number of customers served from 60 to 70 
(a 16.7% increase) leads to a 100% increase in proﬁ ts. Th e 
marginal (additional) cost of service is zero while the 
marginal revenue is high. Maximizing utilization becomes 
a key priority.
Understanding the problem
By deﬁ nition, utilization cannot exceed 100%. Th e 
money-seeking manager is thus tempted to seek almost 
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As your hospital’s ICU director, you are approached by 
the hospital’s administration to help solve ongoing 
problems with ICU bed availability. The ICU seems to be 
constantly full, and trauma patients in the emergency 
department sometimes wait up to 24 hours before 
receiving a bed. Additionally, the cardiac surgeons were 
forced to cancel several elective coronary-artery bypass 
graft cases because there was not a bed available for 
postoperative recovery. The hospital administrators 
ask whether you can decrease your ICU length of stay, 
and wonder whether they should expand the ICU to 
include more beds For help in understanding and 
optimizing your ICU’s throughput, you seek out the 
operations management researchers at your university.
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100% utilization. And high utilization, in and by itself, is 
not a problem. To see this, assume in an example process 
that customers arrive exactly once every 5 minutes (12 
customers arrive per hour). Further, assume that it takes 
us exactly 4 minutes to serve each customer (thus, we 
could serve up to 15 customers per hour). Th e resulting 
utilization in this process would be 12 / 15 = 80%. We 
might be tempted to call this a 20% under utilization and 
seek additional demand to improve our proﬁ tability.
Th is strategy, however, would ignore an important 
reality of service delivery – variability. Customers are not 
widgets in an assembly line. Th e amount of service time 
depends on the particular needs of the customer at hand. 
Furthermore, the arrival times of individual customers 
may not be known in advance. Th ese sources of un-
certainty create a stochastic eﬀ ect on our process. 
Consider the data shown in Figure 1. Just as before, 12 
customers arrive per hour. Th is time, however, the arrival 
times are random. Similarly, we again take 4 minutes, on 
average, to serve a customer. Yet some customers get 
served quickly while others take longer. Although the 
mean demand and capacity remain constant, Figure 1 
reveals that what previously appeared as an underutilized 
process is in reality a rather busy place. Indeed, some 
customers (for example, the ﬁ fth and sixth customers) 
spend much more time waiting than they spend in 
service. We also observe that the number of customers in 
the process at any one time goes as high as four (three 
waiting, one being served). Contrast this with the 
previous deterministic scenario, where each customer is 
served immediately upon arrival.
Variability is the enemy of operations. An 80% utiliza-
tion of an automated assembly line with limited or no 
variability might be underutilized; an 80% utilization of a 
time-critical service in the presence of variability is 
asking for trouble. Th e example in Figure 1 assumed that 
customers would patiently wait in line until it is their 
turn to be served. But it is easy to conceive of settings in 
which customers might not be able or willing to wait. Th e 
branch of operations management that mathematically 
analyzes the interplay between process ﬂ ows, utilization, 
and variability is referred to as queuing theory. Various 
mathematical models exist to inform the capacity 
planning in such an environment. For example, one 
might ask for the amount of capacity that is needed (the 
number of people to be hired, or the equipment to be 
purchased) so that customers get served in a given 
expected wait time.
One of the most prominent ﬁ ndings in this line of work 
is the insight that the average waiting time increases 
dramatically at higher levels of utilization. Speciﬁ cally, 
the average waiting grows proportionally to a formula: 
utilization / (1 – utilization). Th is ﬁ nding has substantial 
practical implications. For example, for a utilization of 
80%, the ratio of 0.8 / (1 – 0.8) equates to 4. For a utiliza-
tion of 90%, this ratio grows to 0.9 / (1 – 0.9) = 9. A 10% 
Figure 1. Waiting time example. In this example a sample process takes an average of 4 minutes and 12 customers arrive randomly per hour. 
Time (minutes) is presented on the y axis. Top: the total process time, with the service time in blue and the wait time in red. Bottom: the number of 
customers in the process at any one time.
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increase in utilization can therefore more than double 
the waiting time. Th is detrimental eﬀ ect on the process’s 
responsiveness needs to be kept in mind when we accept 
more demand in an attempt to increase utilization. 
Similar mathematical models exist for the case in which 
waiting is not possible. For example, one can predict the 
percentage of customers that will be lost due to capacity 
shortfalls when customers are unwilling or unable to wait.
Better, not more
Our waiting time example illustrates the fundamental 
tradeoﬀ  between the eﬃ  ciency of a process as measured 
by its utilization and its responsiveness as measured by 
its waiting time. Th e waiting time is reduced as more 
resources are added. Operations management tools – in 
particular, queuing theory – can help to ﬁ nd the right 
positioning along the eﬃ  ciency–responsiveness frontier. 
But operations management can do more than just trade-
oﬀ  one desirable process characteristic against another. 
Operations management is also about innovation. By 
creating an innovative process redesign, the aim is to 
shift out the frontier instead of simply supporting the 
optimal position on the current frontier (Figure 2). Th e 
process becomes better.
New frontiers might be reached by overcoming 
ineﬃ  ciencies in the present process design (often referred 
to as waste) or by creating the ﬂ exibility to better cope 
with variability. Industrial pioneers such as Henry Ford 
reached new frontiers by redeﬁ ning the production of 
physical goods. As work was increasingly divided, crafts-
men were replaced by less skilled workers. Production 
processes were perfected over the subsequent decades, 
culminating in the legendary Toyota Production System 
that is now widely regarded as the gold standard for 
excellent operations [4,5]. Th e Toyota Production System 
emphasizes the need to continuously improve a process, 
driving out the so-called seven sources of waste: excess 
production, waiting times, transport steps, excessively 
Figure 2. Interaction of process responsiveness and productivity. Top: the tradeoff  between responsiveness and productivity in a given 
process. Bottom: how process redesign can improve both responsiveness and utilization.
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long activity times, inventory, rework (ﬁ xing quality 
problems), and unnecessary motions. Work ﬂ ows are 
opti mized, capacity levels are chosen to match demand, 
activities are standardized, and protocols are imple men-
ted to standardize work, to reduce defects, and improve 
productivity.
Example 1: focus – the US Airline industry and the 
emergence of Southwest Airlines
Th e US Airline industry is a tough place in which to 
compete, and many airlines have experienced ﬁ nancial 
losses and bankruptcies. An interesting exception is 
South west Airlines, which has created a number of 
eﬃ  ciency-related innovations in the air travel process 
and in turn has been rewarded with outstanding growth 
and proﬁ tability. Many of these innovations reﬂ ect the 
company’s decision to focus on speciﬁ c market segments 
and operational processes. For example, Southwest 
Airlines oﬀ ers only economy-class seating, has a 
standard ized check-in process, ﬂ ies only one type of 
aircraft, and minimizes extraneous amenities such as 
meals and entertainment. Such focus has led to sub stan-
tial process improvements by reducing both customer-
related and process-related variability. Consequently, 
Southwest Airlines can achieve high levels of utilization 
and improved service times, while being able to 
command only marginally lower fares compared with 
their competitors (Figure 3).
Example 2: quick response – local production and quick 
replenishment at Zara
Few industries are plagued by variability like the fashion 
industry, in which consumer tastes are ﬁ ckle and orders 
are placed far in advance, typically to be produced in far-
oﬀ  places like East Asia. Consequently, retailers often end 
up with not enough of some products to meet demand 
(leading to missed sales opportunities) and too much of 
other products (requiring substantial mark-downs and 
lost proﬁ ts). Zara’s operational innovation has been one 
of local production, with approximately 50% of its 
merchandise sourced from its home country of Spain. At 
ﬁ rst glance, local production appears ineﬃ  cient as wages 
in Spain are signiﬁ cantly higher than in East Asia. Th e 
local production allows for quick and frequent 
replenishment, however, enabling a tight integration 
between Zara’s retail operation and their production 
process. As a result, Zara builds in ﬂ exibility into its 
operation and is able to react to unanticipated swings in 
demand.
Example 3: capacity pooling and chaining – Honda’s 
platform strategy
Variability is the enemy of operations, yet the risks 
associated with variability decrease as we aggregate many 
independent sources of variability. For example, the 
ﬁ nancial risk of ﬁ re for an individual home owner is large, 
yet an insurance company with millions of ﬁ re policies 
faces relatively lower risk. Aggregating variability across 
independent sources is the idea behind capacity pooling. 
Consider an automotive company that operates multiple 
manufacturing plants and produces diﬀ erent models. A 
given car model can only be produced in exactly one 
plant. If demand increases relative to the forecast, that 
plant is unlikely to have suﬃ  cient capacity to fulﬁ ll it. 
Conversely, if demand decreases, the plant is likely to 
have excess capacity. Th e company can mitigate some of 
the demand–supply mismatch by pooling its capacity. 
Speciﬁ cally, if every model could be made at every plant, 
high demand from one model can be served with spare 
capacity due to low demand from another, leading to 
better plant utilization and more sales. Such capacity 
pooling, however, would require the plants to be perfectly 
ﬂ exible – requiring substantial investments in production 
tools and worker skills. An interesting alternative to such 
perfect ﬂ exibility is the concept of partial ﬂ exibility, also 
referred to as chaining. Th e idea of chaining is that every 
car can be made in two plants and that the vehicle-to-
plant assignment creates a chain that connects as many 
vehicles and plants as possible. Such partial ﬂ exibility can 
be shown to result in almost the same beneﬁ ts of full 
ﬂ exibility, yet at dramatically lower costs [6].
Applying operations management to critical care
ICUs are faced with nearly the same throughput an d 
capacity problems as the companies in our examples. Th e 
Figure 3. Productivity comparison in the US airline industry. 
Compared with other US airlines, Southwest Airlines achieves similar 
yields with greater effi  ciency. Lufthansa and Ryanair are added 
as non-US illustrative benchmarks. ASM, available seat mile; RPM, 
revenue passenger mile.
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vast majority of critical care costs are ﬁ xed, resulting in 
substantial revenue increases with each additional patient 
[7]. ICUs also frequently operate at or near capacity, with 
subsequently large waiting times for admission [8]. Simply 
expanding capacity is not feasible due to space limitations 
within hospitals, workforce shortages, and government 
regulations [9]. Neither is expanding capacity necessarily 
desirable. As the above examples teach us, in the face of 
variable demand, expanding capacity can ultimately result 
in higher ﬁ xed costs, excess capacity, and long-term 
ineﬃ  ciencies.
Th e science of operations management is speciﬁ cally 
designed to solve these problems. ICU throughput is at 
heart a complex service problem – patients are just 
customers arriving at random times and with varying 
needs. Each takes a diﬀ erent amount of service time. Th e 
overall goal is to maximize quality while minimizing 
waste. In the ICU, quality comes in the form of low 
mortality and waste comes in the form of wait times (that 
is, admission delays), excess activity times (that is, long 
lengths of stay), and the need for rework (that is, the 
eﬀ ort required to care for ICU-acquired complications 
and ICU readmissions).). Operations management not 
only can help tradeoﬀ  capacity and eﬃ  ciency under our 
current process, but can also help us shift the frontier 
through continuous process improvement.
Th e ﬁ rst step is to understand the current process. 
What is the ICU utilization, and how much does it vary? 
What are the sources of ICU demand, and how much of 
that demand is random versus predictable? What is the 
average ICU length of stay (service time) and how does it 
diﬀ er between diﬀ erent patient types? How much of the 
current activity is true production versus waste in the 
form of ICU readmissions or discharge delays?
Th e next step is to apply queuing theory to mathe-
matically formulate the current process and determine 
the point on the utilization curve that will maximize 
responsiveness and productivity. Increasing capacity 
might be necessary to achieve optimal throughput, or 
might only result in excess resources. Sometimes these 
results can be surprising. For example, an empiric 
analysis of ICU readmissions in the cardiac ICU at the 
University of Pennsylvania Hospital found that an 
aggressive early discharge policy resulted in an increase 
in overall capacity, even accounting for the increase in 
readmissions [10].
Th e ﬁ nal step is the search for ways to improve the 
current processes to increase throughput. Taking a lesson 
from Toyota, standardizing care through protocols might 
lead to decreased waste in the form of hospital-acquired 
infections or excess ventilator-days [11]. Splitting the 
single surgical ICU into two subspecialty ICUs (one for 
trauma and one for cardiac surgery) might introduce 
economies of scope, by which the specialty ICUs can 
perform their services more eﬃ  ciently. Th is situation 
would be analogous to Southwest Airlines, which 
increased eﬃ  ciency in part by limiting the scope of their 
services. To prevent adverse eﬀ ects from boarding and to 
retain some of the gains from capacity pooling, each ICU 
could be cross-trained to care for the other’s least sick 
patients – a form of chaining. Another approach might 
be to search for ways to minimize the eﬀ ects of variable 
demand. For instance, if trauma cases tend to occur on 
the weekends, rescheduling elective cardiac cases from 
Friday to Monday could create capacity when it is most 
needed.
Conclusion
Operations management optimizes business processes. 
From traditional manufacturing to distribution and 
services, the principles and insights from operations 
manage ment have been used successfully to help ﬁ rms 
better manage their businesses. Determining the appro-
priate level of capacity is often challenging, particularly 
when dealing with variability from multiple sources. 
Operations management provides us with the tools to 
determine the optimal level of capacity and to manage 
the tradeoﬀ s inherent in demand–supply mismatches.
Operations management, however, is not just about 
optimizing a given process or capacity allocation 
decision  – it is also about improving process through 
innovation. Th e three examples discussed above oﬀ er a 
glimpse into the kinds of process innovations used by 
highly successful ﬁ rms, but there are many more such 
innovations being used by ﬁ rms both large and small 
[12]. Perhaps the greatest role operations management 
can play in the ICU is in teaching us how to apply these 
innovations to hospital medicine, thereby improving 
both the quality and eﬃ  ciency of critical care.
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